Relations have certainly improved, as has security cooperation. But progress on economic cooperation remains meagre.
Practical and political hurdles include:
- the EU is broadly satisfied with its existing trade deal with the UK, and has more pressing priorities than trying to deepen their economic ties;
- the EU is reluctant to give the UK special treatment (“no cherry picking”), though it is being more flexible in a few areas;
- the UK remains hemmed in by Labour’s election-manifesto red lines: no return to the single market, customs union or freedom of movement;
- the UK still wants to have its cake and eat it, eg, participate in parts of the single market without making EU budget contributions;
- even now, the UK is reluctant to choose the EU over the US.
What might break this deadlock?
A pro-EU shift in the UK. Starmer’s weakness is pushing him towards closer alignment with the single market, while his leadership rivals favour a customs union with the EU.
But given Labour’s red lines, any big shift would likely come only in its next manifesto – and only be implemented if Labour wins the next election, which must be held by 2029.
The EU’s position may also evolve. Fast-tracking Ukraine’s entry by offering it a form of associate membership sets a precedent that could be applied elsewhere. In the wake of Trump’s rupture of the global order and Western alliance, the EU is looking at ways to cooperate more closely with allies such as Canada, which could prompt fresh thinking about institutional flexibility.
The biggest catalyst for change could be an even greater sense of common threat – eg, if Trump quits NATO.
But so far there hasn’t been a strategic discussion on the underlying issue of how to protect liberal democracy from the forces trying to destroy it, and how the EU-UK relationship fits into that.
It would make sense for the UK to rejoin the EU but sadly that still seems a distant prospect.
Read my latest piece for the Brussels Times.