Belgium’s debt drift

Ernest Hemingway famously observed that debtors go bankrupt in two ways – gradually, then suddenly.

The good news is that, for now, Belgium is still going bust gradually. Government debt is high and creeping up, but the situation is not yet catastrophic.

The bad news is that amid economic stagnation, institutional gridlock and relentlessly rising spending demands due to demography, defence and debt interest, the country’s polarised political system seems unlikely to put public finances on a sustainable footing unless a crisis suddenly strikes.

Read my latest piece for Brussels Times

How to revitalise Europe’s economy

EU leaders have just gathered for yet another discussion on how to make Europe’s economy more “competitive”. That’s the wrong target; the aim should be to make the EU more dynamic.

While the EU has suffered big external shocks in recent years – Russian energy, US tariffs, Chinese competition – the core problem is its corporatist economic model, which favours established companies in mature industries over innovative startups in growth sectors like tech.

While many things need to change, at EU level there are 3 big levers for economic reform: deeper integration in the EU’s incomplete single market; lighter-touch regulation for smaller companies and innovative sectors; and increased investment, not least in venture capital.

Read my latest column for Brussels Times.

The Economist reviews European Spring

European Spring is reviewed as part of the lead review in this week’s Economist.

The Economist writes:

Philippe Legrain, who once worked for The Economist, was another close observer of the euro crisis, as an economic adviser to the European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso. His conclusions are similar to Mr Pisani-Ferry’s, if more stridently expressed. He is particularly good on (and particularly scathing about) the shortcomings of his own institution and the ECB. He is not popular in Brussels or Frankfurt.

Mr Legrain argues that Europe should have tackled its banks’ problems much sooner than mid-2012, when it decided to create a (still incomplete) banking union. A big reason why America has recently grown faster than Europe is that it did more to sort out its banks in 2008-09. Mr Legrain is also right to criticise the ECB for its half-hearted bond purchases before July 2012, when it finally emerged as a proper lender of last resort. Only in the second part of his book, when he moves into broader topics such as education, innovation, climate change and democracy, culminating in his call for a “European spring”, are his arguments sometimes less persuasive.

Both authors agree that the aftermath of the crisis is an unsatisfactory one that may not endure. Even if markets do not turn sour again, most of Europe seems stuck with low growth, high unemployment (especially for young people) and a horrible debt burden. The risk of a “lost decade” similar to Japan’s in the 1990s is worryingly high. Worst of all is the broad disillusion of voters with the entire European project, which will be expressed in this month’s European elections through big gains for populist and extremist parties….

What is striking is how much the authors agree about the failings of the EU and the euro, which is stuck in a half-completed house. Where they differ is in the solutions they propose.Europhiles want deeper integration and more centralised powers. That was proposed this spring by the German-led Glienicker group and by the French-led Eiffel Europe group. It is also backed by Loukas Tsoukalis, a Greek academic, in an essay, “The Unhappy State of the Union”, published by London-based Policy Network.

Yet few voters feel warmly about ever closer union; many would agree with Mr Bootle that this aspiration of the original Treaty of Rome should be formally ditched. Nor do many welcome ever greater intrusion by Brussels and Frankfurt into domestic politics. A more plausible idea, backed by Mr Legrain, is to restore greater freedom to national governments but reinstate the principle that they will not be rescued by the centre if they get into trouble.

The biggest worry may stem from the perception that the crisis is over. This is likely to slow or even stop further reforms. If that happens, the EU and the euro will get into trouble again—and the outcome next time could be even worse.

John Peet, Europe Editor of The Economist, adds:

Philippe Legrain convincingly argues that euro-zone policymakers made several big mistakes: there was too much fiscal austerity, they were too slow in trying to mend the banks and the European Central Bank delayed for too long in becoming a lender of last resort. The euro may have survived, but the system remains unstable and Europe still needs a lot more reform if it is to prosper.

Eurozone voters have been blackmailed and betrayed. No wonder they’re angry

The European Union was often unpopular even before the financial crisis. But the long slump and eurozone policymakers’ blunders have created a political firestorm. Support for the EU has plunged to all-time lows. Most Europeans now associate it with austerity, recession and German domination, with constraints on what they can do, rather than on how we can achieve more together. Anti-EU parties, often xenophobic and comprising reactionary extremists, are set to do well in next week’s European elections. Europe urgently needs to change course.

But while critics such as Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen are generally wrong, and their solutions worse, it is foolish to deny that terrible mistakes have been made in recent years, especially in the eurozone. As I know first hand, having worked directly with the European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, EU institutions are often dysfunctional, unduly dominated by Germany, and not democratic enough. To start to put things right – and thus win back support for the EU – one needs to be unflinchingly honest about what has gone wrong.

The crisis has shredded trust in mainstream politicians’ competence and motives. They failed to prevent the crisis and have proved incapable of resolving it. They bailed out banks and their creditors while slashing spending on poor schoolchildren. They inflict suffering on others, while remaining largely unscathed themselves. No wonder voters are angry.

In Britain they can at least throw the rascals out. But in the eurozone, flawed and unjust policies have been imposed by policymakers in Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt who are unaccountable to local voters.

When Greece’s debts became unbearable in 2010 they should have been written down, with the French, German and other banks that had recklessly lent to the Greek government taking losses.

But to bail out those banks, eurozone governments instead compounded the problem, lending their taxpayers’ money to Greece. The bad lending of private banks thus became obligations between governments. To try to recover their loans, eurozone policymakers then imposed brutal austerity, causing a longer and deeper slump than that which Germany suffered in the 1930s.

Blackmailed by the threat of being forced out of the euro, local taxpayers in Ireland, Portugal and Spain were also bullied into paying for foreign banks’ mistakes. In late 2010, the Irish government tried to backtrack on its foolish guarantee of all Irish bank debt, largely owed to German, British and French banks. But Germany, the European commission and, above all, the European Central Bank strong-armed Ireland into continuing to repay foreign banks with taxpayers’ money. The bill for bailing out the foreign creditors that financed Ireland’s bust banks is €64bn – €14,000 for every person there.

Abusing the desire of the Greeks, the Irish and others to be part of Europe – and their fear of being forced out of the euro – to impose iniquitous conditions on them is the very opposite of the solidarity on which the European project is meant to be based.

Thus, a crisis that could have united Europe in a collective effort to curb the banks that got us into this mess has instead divided it, pitting creditor countries – primarily Germany – against debtor ones, with EU institutions becoming instruments for creditors to impose their will on debtors.

Policymakers also wrongly concluded from Greece that Europe as a whole faced an immediate fiscal crisis – and while failing to tackle the banking and private debt problems they lurched into collective austerity, depressing demand so much that they worsened public finances. When their further mistakes sparked panic, they demanded ever more austerity. A study by a European commission official using its own economic model concludes that this collective, excessive austerity caused a cumulative loss of nearly 10% of eurozone GDP – and nobody has been held to account. That the ECB – finally – halted the panic, austerity has been eased off and economies have stabilised hardly excuses the earlier mistakes, while unemployment remains extremely high.

The enduring legacy of bailing out the banks that lent to Greece is a rigid system of centralised fiscal controls. Because Angela Merkel agreed to breach the legal stipulation that eurozone governments cannot bail out their peers, German taxpayers suddenly feared they were liable for everyone else’s debts. So she demanded much greater control over other countries’ budgets – and the commission was delighted to oblige.

This EU straitjacket is economically dangerous, because countries that share a currency need greater fiscal flexibility, not less. And it is politically poisonous, because when voters throw out their government, EU fiscal enforcer Olli Rehn pops up on television to insist the new one stick to the previous one’s failed policies. Denying voters democratic choices about tax and spending alienates people from the EU. And if voting for mainstream politicians doesn’t lead to change, it is no surprise that people turn to the extremes.

Instead of a eurozone shaped by Germany’s narrow interests as a creditor, we need one that works for all its citizens. Zombie banks need to be restructured; excessive debts written down.

More investment is needed, along with reforms to boost productivity (and thus wages). Elected governments need much greater discretion over their budgets, constrained by markets’ willingness to lend and, ultimately, by the possibility of default. A fairer, freer and richer eurozone is in Germany’s enlightened self-interest too.

The EU as a whole also needs to be more open, accountable and democratic. Europeans need a much greater say over the very political decisions that the EU takes – and the right to change course. To save the EU, we need to fix it.

European Spring: Why Our Economies and Politics are in a Mess – and How to Put Them Right

European Spring Full Cover

Britain and the rest of Europe are in a mess. Our economies are failing to deliver higher living standards for most people and many have lost faith in politicians’ ability to deliver a brighter future, with support for parties like UKIP soaring. Are stagnation, decline and disillusionment inevitable? Do people have to turn to the likes of UKIP for alternative solutions?

As a critically acclaimed author who was until recently a senior policymaker, Philippe Legrain has a unique combination of insider knowledge, intellectual authority and independent perspective that make him ideally placed to explain why things have gone wrong – and how to put them right. In this brilliantly original and passionate book, he explains why we need a European Spring: economic and political renewal.

“Philippe Legrain provides an original and insightful analysis of what has gone wrong with Europe’s economies and politics and a timely warning that the crisis ultimately threatens our open societies. Better still, he provides a blueprint for a brighter future and how to achieve it.” — George Soros

That is the blurb for my new book, which will be published on 24 April. Pre-order the Kindle edition in the UK now from Amazon.co.uk It’s a snip at only £2.99

Order it in France from Amazon.fr for €3.08

Order it in Spain from Amazon.es for €3.08

Order it in Germany from Amazon.de for €3.08

Order it in Italy from Amazon.it for €3.08

Order it in the US from Amazon.com for $4.73

 

 

 

Vågar Europa de reformer som behövs?

Större delen av Europa har levt i kris sex hela år. Banker har konkursat – och blivit utlösta. Skulderna har vuxit sig större. Paniken närapå slet sönder euron. Ekonomier har stagnerat eller krympt. Löner har sjunkit. Arbetslösheten har skjutit i höjden. På det hela taget har eurozonen drabbats värre än under den stora depressionen på 1930-talet.

Efter denna långa, mörka vinter har experter och politiker hälsat de första magra tecknen på tillväxt som en signal om att bättre tider är på gång. Fast en svala gör ingen sommar. Även om utsikterna är bättre än för ett år sedan förblir utvecklingen klen i det korta perspektivet, och utmaningarna på längre sikt enorma.

Detta är uppenbart i södra Europa. I Grekland, där nationalinkomsten har sjunkit med en fjärdedel letar barnen efter matrester i soptunnorna medan sjukhusen har brist på mediciner. Krossad under en ohållbar statsskuld fortsätter landets inåtvända ekonomi att krympa. I Spanien, där mer än en av fyra saknar arbete, tar så många livet av sig att självmord blivit den största dödsorsaken efter de naturliga.

I Italien saknar två av fem ungdomar arbete – i Grekland och Spanien nära tre av fem. En förlorad generation håller på att skapas. Är det då förvånande att unga européer föder ännu färre barn sedan krisen bröt ut och att någon emigrerar från Portugal var fjärde minut?

 I norra Europa är situationen inte lika alarmerande, men ändå rätt dyster. Frankrike föll ned i recession under andra halvåret 2013. Det ryck i tillväxten som Storbritannien nyligen gjort ser ut att vara farligt instabilt: trots att lönerna sjunkit med en tiondel, lånar konsumenterna för att spendera mera och därmed blåsa upp ännu en bostadsbubbla.

Till och med Tyskland är mycket svagare än vad folk tror. Inbromsningen i Kina och fallet i Sydeuropa skadar Tysklands export samtidigt som köpkraften förblir svag och investeringsnivåerna når nya bottennoteringar. Sedan 2008 har den tyska ekonomin bara växt med totalt 2,5 procent. Sverige har klarat det dubbla. I Berlin har passiviteten satt in. Enligt OECD har man, sedan krisens början, gjort mindre än något annat land för att reformera sin ekonomi.

På kort sikt är det största hindret för tillväxt en ouppklarad bankkris till följd av överdriven skuldsättning. Hushållen i Europa är nästan lika skuldtyngda som de var 2008 och statsskulden är mycket större. Många banker är zombies–varken påfyllda med tillräckligt nytt kapital att låna ut, eller avlivade. Företagen varken kan eller vill investera. Lovande delar av ekonomin är ofta svältfödda på resurser att växa med, eller bakbundna av snåriga regleringar och konkurrenshinder.

Problemet förvärras av den långvariga avmattningen av produktiviteten och enorma befolkningsförändringar. Sedan mitten av 1990-talet har Europa halkat ännu längre efter USA: medan produktiviteten hos amerikanska arbetare ökade med 1,8 procent om året det senaste decenniet, med Sverige hack i häl, var genomsnittet för eurozonen bara 0,9 procent med Grekland bara en bråkdel före Tyskland, och med Italien på noll. Kombinationen av en klen produktivitetsökning och den demografiska tendensen att arbetskraften minskar i åldrande samhällen gör att den ekonomiska tillväxten blir fortsatt svag.

Stagnation och nedgång är inte oundvikligt. En omstrukturering av banker och nedskrivning av lån skulle ge ekonomierna ett lyft. Djärva reformer skulle kunna starta en våg av innovationer och företagande. Ökad invandring skulle hjälpa. Det går att göra mer för att hjälpa exporten till snabbväxande ekonomier som Kinas. Men har Europas politiker modet att konfrontera alla de etablerade egenintressen som hindrar tillväxten?

Economics in the dock

In this week’s FT, Gideon Rachman argued that “maybe it is time for an alternative to the brash certainties, peddled by those pseudo-scientists, otherwise known as economists.”

Tim Harford then hit back with a defence of economics, and Diane Coyle has also joined the fray.

I know, like and respect all three of them, and I think they all make valid points. As someone who studied economics and writes about it, yet has always found some of the central tenets of mainstream macroeconomics unconvincing, I think to a certain extent they are talking at cross purposes.

Gideon’s main critique is of macroeconomics, while Tim’s robust defence is primarily of microeconomics. Gideon points out that economics isn’t physics, and Tim replies that it is more than history. A dispassionate observer might conclude that they both have a point.

Focusing on mainstream macroeconomics, though, I agree with Gideon that a lot of it is bunk.

Neoclassical economics assumes that markets move from one defined equilibrium to another, and assumes away the influence of financial markets altogether. Hence the inability to predict, or even expect, the financial crisis.

Many free-marketeers are attracted to neoclassical economics because they think it “proves” that markets are efficient and that government intervention generally makes matters worse.

In fact, it does no such thing, because if you assume away uncertainty, an all-knowing central planner could allocate resources just as efficiently as free markets.

New Keynesian economics, which grafts a rationale for government intervention on to neoclassical economics, is equally misguided.

It suffers from most of the same flaws that neoclassical economics does. And it isn’t Keynesian at all, since it basically ignores the crucial role of uncertainty.

I think our understanding of macroeconomics should draw on a synthesis of Hayek and Keynes.

While they differed on many things, they both understood that economies are continually in flux, that the future is fundamentally unknowable (not a point on a known probability distribution),and hence that the role of finance and entrepreneurs – both of whom create markets in the future – is crucial.

As I wrote in the conclusion to my new book, Aftershock:

Market economies are not computable machines that shift predictably from one steady state to another, they are dynamic, unfathomably complex organisms that are forever evolving – unsurprisingly, since they are made up of millions of human beings continually interacting with each other. Nor is economic growth a mechanical process oiled by new technologies that appear metronomically as manna from heaven. It is an ongoing voyage of discovery into an unknowable future, fuelled by ingenuity and energy, trialled by enterprising businesses and stimulated by competition within a framework of supportive institutions.

Unwise and unfair

George Osborne described it as “unavoidable” and “progressive”, Vince Cable as “necessary” and “fair”. Don’t blame us, Tweedledee and Tweedledum suggest, Labour left the public finances in a mess – and unless we tighten our belts drastically now, the markets will force our hand. But in fact, the timing, extent and manner of this brutal surgery were a matter of choice. The Liberal Conservative coalition did not have to cut so far, so fast; nor did it have to raise VAT, which will hit the poor hardest.

Britain’s economy is on life support. Banks aren’t lending enough, companies are wary of investing, our biggest export market – the euro zone – is in crisis, and consumption is subdued. Faced with a collapse of private demand, public spending has propped the economy up. But now the coalition is planning to take away that government support much faster than Labour proposed to. Is the economy strong enough to stand on its own two feet? It’s a huge gamble.

The immediate danger is that a drop in demand will plunge the economy into a double-dip recession. That would cause a lot of pain without much budgetary gain: a smaller structural deficit would be offset by a larger cyclical one, leaving the country poorer but the government still borrowing almost as much. Far from shoring up confidence, as Cable suggests, the budget could shred it. Weighed down by huge debts, the economy might stagnate for years, as Japan did after its bubble burst twenty years ago.

Another big danger is that the economy will stagger back to its bad old ways instead of developing along new and healthier lines. Now, more than ever, Britain is relying on a prolonged period of near-zero interest rates to sustain the recovery. Fiscal austerity for monetary licence – that is the bargain that the Chancellor has struck with his chum Mervyn King, the not-so-independent governor of the Bank of England and newly promoted plenipotentiary for financial regulation (an assignment he does not merit, given his insouciance during the bubble years and his role in the Northern Rock fiasco). But with Britons still addicted to property speculation, big banks still unreformed and able to gamble with government guarantees, and the authorities depending on monetary policy to boost growth, we risk inflating a new financial bubble to rescue us from the bursting of the last one.

This emergency budget was a missed opportunity to tilt Britain towards more balanced and sustainable growth. Instead of increasing VAT next January – which will raise £13 billion a year – the government could have phased in a tax of £30 a tonne on carbon emissions. That would not only raise around £16 billion a year, it would curb carbon emissions while stimulating investment in clean-tech companies and the green jobs of the future.

An even better way to fill the budget gap and rebalance the economy would be to introduce a tax on land values. With all the land in Britain worth perhaps £5 trillion, a 0.5% levy could raise £25 billion a year. That could be used to cut the deficit, trim national insurance, and protect public spending on the most vulnerable.

Taxing wealthy landowners’ windfall gains would also limit property speculation and fund new social housing. And since growth-promoting infrastructure investment raises surrounding values, Crossrail and a high-speed rail network would pay for themselves and thus not fall victim to short-sighted budget cuts.

Over time, shifting the tax burden off labour and on to land would create jobs, reward hard work and promote more stable, sustainable and balanced growth. And since nearly all of us earn most of our lifetime income from work rather than from rent, taxing land instead of labour would make most people better off.

The Attlee government introduced a tax on land values in 1947, a measure the Conservatives unfortunately repealed in 1951. As Labour’s leadership candidates consider how best to respond to this unwise and unfair budget, they would do well to revive the idea.

Ferraris for all

I had the pleasure of meeting Daniel Ben-Ami on Saturday and recommend you check out his blog and his book, Ferraris for All, which is out in July and makes the important case for economic progress, which too many people in the West have unfortunately lost confidence in.

As I argue in Aftershock, we should take inspiration from the optimism of people in emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil who know all too well that economic progress is real, and that it makes the world freer, fairer and more secure.

Another dangerous property boom

House prices rose by 10.5% in the 12 months to April. A typical home now costs £167,800, according to Nationwide – more than in August 2008, the month before Lehman Brothers collapsed, credit seized up and the economy fell off a cliff. It’s as if the financial crisis and the worst recession since the 1930s had never happened.

While home owners – especially those who had fallen into negative equity – will cheer the housing market’s bounce, it is high time Britons were weaned off their addiction to property speculation. It is a dangerous delusion that we can all prosper by swapping more or less the same stock of houses with each other at ever more inflated prices. Unfortunately, few politicians – with the notable exception of Vince Cable– propose to do anything about this nationwide pyramid scheme. After all, another fix of house-price inflation that got consumers spending again would appear to be a pain-free way to stimulate the recovery. In truth, though, it would be recklessly unsustainable.

Fortunately, the housing market is not yet as bubbly as the headline figures suggest. Volumes remain depressed: half as many properties are changing hands as two years ago. And while London prices are being pushed up by bulging City bonuses and foreign investors capitalising on the weak pound to snap up prime property in the capital, the rest of the country is looking less perky. Even so, it is astonishing that prices are notching up double-digit growth with the economy stagnant and houses still extremely expensive. Priced at more than five times average earnings, the typical house is more exorbitant than at the height of the 1989 property boom.

In part, this is because the supply of new houses – which is constrained by planning restrictions and the failure of successive governments to build enough social housing – has failed to keep pace with rising demand. This is notably due to more single people wanting to live alone; blaming immigration is a red herring – while house prices at their peak in 2007 were two-and-a-half times as high as in 2000, they would have been only 7% lower had net immigration to Britain been zero over that period, according to Stephen Nickell, of Oxford University, whose testimony is quoted in an infamous House of Lords select committee report that was hardly pro-immigration. Mostly, though, property prices are buoyed by financial factors: the availability of cheap credit and the willingness of prospective buyers to borrow huge sums in anticipation of future gains.

The belief that the “property ladder” is the road to riches does all manner of damage. It saps long-term growth by diverting funds – and talent – away from productive investment. Three-quarters of bank loans go to the property sector; many would-be entrepreneurs become property developers instead. It also promotes an unhealthy reliance on the financial sector and debt-fuelled consumption. And it destabilises the economy, as euphoric booms are inevitably followed by nasty busts.

Rising house prices force many families to squeeze into smaller homes, prevent many people from buying a place altogether, and inflict long commutes on people who cannot afford to live near their workplaces in city centres. They transfer wealth from poorer young people to richer older ones. And they fracture society between property haves and have-nots. The biggest beneficiaries are Britain’s big landowners – the 0.3% of the population who own 69% of the land – who get richer each year without lifting a finger. The Duke of Westminster, who inherited 300 acres of what were once fields and are now Mayfair and Belgravia – the priciest parts of central London – is laughing all the way to the bank.

What, then, should the government do? For a start, ease planning restrictions and build more social housing. That does not imply concreting over the countryside: 3 million new homes at the government’s target density would take up a mere 0.3% of the UK’s land area – even less if they were built on brownfield sites. Second, the authorities should restrict mortgage lending when the housing market is getting bubbly through targeted measures – such as requiring banks to hold more capital against property lending – that do not crimp desirable business investment.

Last but not least, the government should introduce a tax on land values. Taxing wealthy landowners’ windfall gains would help curb property speculation, fund new social housing and reduce the budget deficit. Over time, shifting the tax burden off labour and on to land would create jobs, reward hard work and promote more stable, sustainable and balanced growth. Fixing the housing market should be a priority for whichever parties form the new government.

Another dangerous property boom

This article appears in today’s Guardian.

House prices rose by 10.5% in the 12 months to April. A typical home now costs £167,800, according to Nationwide – more than in August 2008, the month before Lehman Brothers collapsed, credit seized up and the economy fell off a cliff. It’s as if the financial crisis and the worst recession since the 1930s had never happened.

While home owners – especially those who had fallen into negative equity – will cheer the housing market’s bounce, it is high time Britons were weaned off their addiction to property speculation. It is a dangerous delusion that we can all prosper by swapping more or less the same stock of houses with each other at ever more inflated prices. Unfortunately, few politicians – with the notable exception of Vince Cable– propose to do anything about this nationwide pyramid scheme. After all, another fix of house-price inflation that got consumers spending again would appear to be a pain-free way to stimulate the recovery. In truth, though, it would be recklessly unsustainable.

Fortunately, the housing market is not yet as bubbly as the headline figures suggest. Volumes remain depressed: half as many properties are changing hands as two years ago. And while London prices are being pushed up by bulging City bonuses and foreign investors capitalising on the weak pound to snap up prime property in the capital, the rest of the country is looking less perky. Even so, it is astonishing that prices are notching up double-digit growth with the economy stagnant and houses still extremely expensive. Priced at more than five times average earnings, the typical house is more exorbitant than at the height of the 1989 property boom.

In part, this is because the supply of new houses – which is constrained by planning restrictions and the failure of successive governments to build enough social housing – has failed to keep pace with rising demand. This is notably due to more single people wanting to live alone; blaming immigration is a red herring – while house prices at their peak in 2007 were two-and-a-half times as high as in 2000, they would have been only 7% lower had net immigration to Britain been zero over that period, according to Stephen Nickell, of Oxford University, whose testimony is quoted in an infamous House of Lords select committee report that was hardly pro-immigration. Mostly, though, property prices are buoyed by financial factors: the availability of cheap credit and the willingness of prospective buyers to borrow huge sums in anticipation of future gains.

The belief that the “property ladder” is the road to riches does all manner of damage. It saps long-term growth by diverting funds – and talent – away from productive investment. Three-quarters of bank loans go to the property sector; many would-be entrepreneurs become property developers instead. It also promotes an unhealthy reliance on the financial sector and debt-fuelled consumption. And it destabilises the economy, as euphoric booms are inevitably followed by nasty busts.

Rising house prices force many families to squeeze into smaller homes, prevent many people from buying a place altogether, and inflict long commutes on people who cannot afford to live near their workplaces in city centres. They transfer wealth from poorer young people to richer older ones. And they fracture society between property haves and have-nots. The biggest beneficiaries are Britain’s big landowners – the 0.3% of the population who own 69% of the land – who get richer each year without lifting a finger. The Duke of Westminster, who inherited 300 acres of what were once fields and are now Mayfair and Belgravia – the priciest parts of central London – is laughing all the way to the bank.

What, then, should the government do? For a start, ease planning restrictions and build more social housing. That does not imply concreting over the countryside: 3 million new homes at the government’s target density would take up a mere 0.3% of the UK’s land area – even less if they were built on brownfield sites. Second, the authorities should restrict mortgage lending when the housing market is getting bubbly through targeted measures – such as requiring banks to hold more capital against property lending – that do not crimp desirable business investment.

Last but not least, the government should introduce a tax on land values. Taxing wealthy landowners’ windfall gains would help curb property speculation, fund new social housing and reduce the budget deficit. Over time, shifting the tax burden off labour and on to land would create jobs, reward hard work and promote more stable, sustainable and balanced growth. Fixing the housing market should be a priority for whichever parties form the new government.

Would a hung parliament really push Britain into the hands of the IMF?

Writing in the FT, Chris Huhne demolishes the Tories’ scaremongering about the perils of a hung parliament:

It is demonstrably wrong to argue that sound economics requires single-party government…

Of the 14 countries that enjoy the top AAA rating for creditworthiness with all three rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s – 10 have coalitions or minority governments including Germany, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. None of those 10 has ever had to call in the IMF.

Only four of the top credit countries have one party controlling a majority in their legislature, namely France, Britain, Singapore and the US. Of all 14, only Britain has ever had to call in the IMF…

Anybody who tried to explain to a German that coalition government was bound to lead to a “national calamity” would find the conversation surreal, since the country with one of the strongest reputations for sound public finance has never had a formal single-party government since the dawn of the Federal Republic.

The only major country to lose its AAA credit rating in recent years was Japan, which had single-party rule for more than 50 years. The country with the biggest credit problems in the markets is Greece, which has always had alternating single-party governments.

Nor are multi-party democracies bad at solving problems. An analysis by the House of Commons library showed that seven of the biggest 10 fiscal consolidations in any developed country since 1970 were undertaken by coalition governments, not “decisive single party government”.

Faced with real crises, such as war, Britain’s history shows that we turn to coalitions. Perhaps the Tories need to be reminded that we won both the world wars with cross-party government.

Touché!

Back to the drawing board for mainstream economics

If there were a simple, single, universal theory of economic behaviour, then the suite of arguments comprising rational expectations, efficient markets and DSGE [dynamic stochastic general equilibrium] would be that theory. Any other way of describing the world would have to recognise that what people do depends on their fallible beliefs and perceptions, would have to acknowledge uncertainty, and would accommodate the dependence of actions on changing social and cultural norms. Models could not then be universal: they would have to be specific to contexts.

The standard approach has the appearance of science in its ability to generate clear predictions from a small number of axioms. But only the appearance, since these predictions are mostly false. The environment actually faced by investors and economic policymakers is one in which actions do depend on beliefs and perceptions, must deal with uncertainty and are the product of a social context. There is no universal economic theory, and new economic thinking must necessarily be eclectic. That insight is Keynes’s greatest legacy.

John Kay in today’s FT

Tax land, not labour

Consider these three facts.

  1. Britain is struggling to recover from a crisis caused in large part by a huge property bubble.
  2. Unemployment is painfully high and people are feeling the pinch.
  3. The government has a huge gap in its finances that cannot be filled by public-spending cuts alone.

What would you raise taxes on?

Astonishingly, Labour is proposing to raise already-high taxes on labour, through an increase in national-insurance contributions. Finance fails, so workers pay—this is not only unfair, it will also damage future growth by making labour more expensive and penalising effort.

Existing income tax and national insurance already increase labour costs by half, while a single person on two-thirds of average wages faces an effective tax rate of over 40 per cent on every additional pound they earn. Raising taxes on something the government wants to encourage—hard work—is perverse.

Another option is taxing harmful things, like carbon emissions. A charge of £30 a tonne could raise around £16bn and reduce emissions. Even better, if the tax per tonne rose as emissions fell, it would ensure a steady source of revenue. But still bigger gains could come from taxing an unproductive asset at the heart of our most recent bubble: land.

Britons have long seemed addicted to property speculation. Yet swapping more or less the same stock of houses with each other cannot logically create riches for society as a whole. Indeed, it has huge costs because it diverts funds from productive investment—while the resulting boom and bust, as we know, can cause havoc. Taxing land could curb property bubbles, and encourage productive investment elsewhere.

It would work by valuing land holdings every year (based on recent market transactions in the same area) and imposing a charge. If this was raised when land values were rising fastest, it would take the steam out of any bubbles—without affecting the rest of the economy, as interest rates do.

A land tax would be efficient as well as stabilising. Whereas taxing income from work is wasteful—less is produced, and no tax is raised on the lost output—land supply is fixed. So shifting the tax burden from labour to land would boost growth, according to an OECD study. No matter how heavily you tax it, land cannot move, or be spirited away to a tax haven.

And since land values in Britain are huge, even a low tax rate could raise big sums of money. The rate could be tapered so that small landholders pay very little while large ones pay much more.

Land already accounts for the bulk of property values, especially in expensive places like central London. But taxing its value, rather than that of property or any improvements to it, would not penalise people who do up their home.

It would also encourage the development of vacant and derelict land where planning permissions it.

Unlike stamp duty, a land-value tax would not be a tax on property purchases, so it would not discourage people moving. And it needn’t force a granny in a big house out of her home; payment could be deferred until her death if necessary.

Critics say the tax is problematic because land is hard to value. Nonsense. Property changes hands all the time; estate agents and surveyors routinely value property as part of their work.

Land-value taxes could be easily and cheaply collected. Hong Kong and Singapore both derive a large share of their revenue from variants of this system and have very low income taxes as a result. Denmark also has a long tradition of land-value taxation.

Perhaps most importantly, land taxes are also fair. Whatever you think of the merits of capitalism, there is nothing intrinsically desirable about the initial distribution of property rights in an economy. In most countries history means the distribution of land is highly unequal.

Land in Britain is more unequally distributed than in Brazil: there 1% of the population owns 49% of the land; here 0.3% per cent owns 69%.

Britain’s biggest landowner, the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry, owns 277,000 acres because he descends from a man who seized vast swathes of Scotland. Far from being taxed, he is rewarded with huge handouts from the Common Agricultural Policy.

What’s more, the value of land increases each year not through landowners’ striving, but that of others. As economic activity in London has soared through the ingenuity and toil of the masses of people who have flocked there, the value of the 300 acres of fields—now known as Mayfair and Belgravia—passed down to successive Dukes of Westminster over three centuries has sky-rocketed to an estimated £6.5 billion.

Wouldn’t it be better to tax that windfall gain rather than the work of those who really generated it? And since the distribution of land is so unequal, taxing it would be progressive too.

Likewise, when a government builds a new railway line and the value of the surrounding property soars, surely it is right that this unearned wealth be taxed. When the Jubilee line extension to Canary Wharf was built, property values adjacent to its stations rose hugely—by £2.8bn at Southwark and Canary Wharf alone.

Land-value taxes would pay for—and thus encourage—public investment in valuable infrastructure. It could fund, for instance, the high-speed rail network that Britain so desperately needs.

Conversely, landowners would be partly compensated for new developments that reduced the value of their land.

The concept has a fine pedigree. David Ricardo, the founder of modern economics, was a fan. So is Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator, while Liberal Democrat shadow chancellor Vince Cable has proposed a “mansions tax”.

Perhaps the most eloquent case for land-value taxes was made by Winston Churchill in 1909.

Roads are made, streets are made, services are improved, electric light turns night into day, water is brought from reservoirs a hundred miles off in the mountains – and all the while the landlord sits still. Every one of those improvements is effected by the labour and cost of other people and the taxpayers. To not one of those improvements does the land monopolist, as a land monopolist, contribute, and yet by every one of them the value of his land is enhanced. He renders no service to the community, he contributes nothing to the general welfare, he contributes nothing to the process from which his own enrichment is derived.

A century on, the rest of us would benefit from finally facing down the ultimate vested interest: the big landowners who still own most of Britain.

This is an extended version of an article that appears in the new Prospect, which is on sale now.

Kaletsky endorses directing Northern Rock to lend

Britain’s banks aren’t lending, which is strangling the economy. The package of measures to support lending to smaller businesses which the government announced yesterday will do some good. But it is not enough.

As I have argued previously, the government should direct nationalised Northern Rock to step into the breach. Anatole Kaletsky endorses this position in today’s Times:

the
quickest and least costly emergency response would be to reverse the policy
of running down Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. Both these banks
are now fully owned by the Government and could be turned into rapidly
growing state-guaranteed lenders.

The plans to run down their lending were right in the circumstances in which
they were nationalised last year, when other private banks were functioning
more or less normally. But things have completely changed and it now makes
sense to reverse their policy of credit contraction. Northern Rock is
ideally positioned to re-expand the supply of mortgages to first-time
buyers, while Bradford & Bingley could revive the flow of finance to
commercial and social housing. The Government could also be much less shy
about exerting its majority control over the Royal Bank of Scotland and its
40 per cent stake in Lloyds-HBOS, by far the biggest commercial and mortgage
lender in the country.